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Summary
Within the context of the case studies presented, there are clear lessons learned and the second 
section of the review (Part 2) draws out those lessons in looking at seed and variety, description of 
community seed production, the support role of public, private, and civil society actors, the role 
of subsidies and technical support, farm level impact, and sustainability. A general theme running 
through all of these case studies is improving farmers’ access to quality seed of desired varieties. 
Topics include varietal identification, seed production, seed quality, seed policy, and seed marketing. 
The main conclusions are: Community seed production is necessary to improve formal and farmer 
seed system links; community seed production objectives should be explicit and include coherent 
activities for closing out, transitioning into commercial entities, or linking with publicly funded 
programs; community seed production is more effective when there is strong collaboration between 
the public sector, the commercial sector, and civil society/NGOs; The lack of standard ex-ante seed 
system diagnostics, including economic analysis to justify the scale and scope of interventions, 
significantly limits the capacity of donors and seed practitioners to make rational investments and 
intervention design decisions.
1. Key results from the review of community seed production 
practices in Africa 
1.1. Seed and Variety
“Don’t judge each day by the harvest you reap but by the seeds that you plant.”
 Robert Louis Stevenson3
The identification of varieties for promotion and production and the management of seed 
varied considerably across the five case studies, reflecting the context and crop, but some clear 
lessons emerge. Across the case studies, the focus was on facilitating farmer access to improved, 
higher yielding, shorter duration varieties and key activities included variety identification and 
seed multiplication. There was little reference or discussion in any of the case studies on variety 
maintenance, selection, or handling of local varieties. At the micro-level, none of these community 
seed production case studies described an explicit process for identifying varieties promoted or 
valuing the benefits of new and improved varieties at farm level. At the macro-level, none of these 
case studies followed an explicit process to understand and describe the role of variety and seed 
quality for key crops, to identify the main seed system constraints and opportunities in terms of 
variety (trait) and seed quality. 
The Uganda case study of common bean involved two bean varieties (K132 and K131) that were 
released in the same year that the farmer seed enterprise (FSE) began production with the same 
varieties. These varieties were identified for production because they had similar characteristics to a 
widely grown and marketable variety (K20) but with higher on station yields. Farmers were given the 
choice of multiplying local land races but preferred K132 and K131 due to better yield performance 
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of K132 versus K131. FSE fields were not inspected but health testing was conducted to assess 
pathogen infection levels and germination. FSE recorded germination rates were 20% higher and had 
lower pathogen infection compared to other commercial sources but the project did not compare 
germination rates or pathogen levels to bean seed from farmers. 
The Tanzania case study of improved pearl millet (Okoa) and sorghum (Pato and Macia) describes an 
explicit focus to increase farmer access to improved varieties in semi-arid areas. The varieties were 
developed by ICRISAT and were officially released by the national program. Key attributes of all varieties 
was shorter duration and higher yield. One variety – Macia – proved vulnerable to birds and ultimately 
had very low rate of adoption. A quality control measure – field isolation – was promoted. While seed 
producers were confused on recommended field isolation distances and there was high variability in 
application, post project surveys of seed producers showed a change in seed production standards.
The Sudan case study involved the promotion of early maturing/drought tolerant varieties of 
sorghum, millet, groundnut and sesame in a conflict-prone area on the northern edge of the 
savannah belt of central-western Sudan, but did not specify the varieties. A lack of seed availability 
was identified as the main constraint for all crops, including early maturing/drought tolerant varieties. 
The study did not discuss disease issues or post-harvest handling of seed. Seed producers were 
trained on quality standards and the project supported inspection but no information was provided 
on the quality of seed produced versus that of other non-project sources or that of farmers. Varieties 
promoted were identified by the agricultural research station under the Ministry of Agriculture.
The Ethiopia case study involved a variety of crops and the focus was to improve farmer access to 
both improved and local land races and increase diversity in a remote semi-arid region. Varieties 
were identified with national research institutes and more than 200 varieties of cereals (wheat, 
maize, sorghum, teff, barley), 60 varieties of pulses (common bean, lentil, cow pea, chickpea), 30 
varieties of vegetable crops (potato and onion) and more than 40 varieties of oil seeds (sesame, 
groundnut, sunflower) were reportedly established in multiplication and demonstration plots across 
nine seed cooperatives. The study does not present information on the process of setting standards 
for the seed cooperative growers but notes that a large number of seed producer fields were 
rejected due to quality. 
The Kenya case study involved promoting a seed supply network of pigeonpea, groundnut, and 
chickpea varieties with desirable market traits. Varieties were identified by ICRISAT and the national 
research organization. Two qualities of seed were marketed, one considered ‘first generation’ and a 
second called ‘grain’, which was described as 2–3 generation. 
1.2. Description of Community Seed Producer (CSP)
“A proper community, we should remember also, is a commonwealth: a place, a resource, an economy.”
Wendell Berry3
The five case studies took different approaches to community seed production. This reflects the 
operating environment, socio-political systems and norms, cropping systems, and aim of the study 
protagonists. CSP was employed differently as a function of the situation.
Institutional and economic sustainability of CSP groups was a key consideration in the Uganda 
study. The community seed producers were called ‘farmer seed enterprises’, they were groups of 
10–12 women, the sites were identified based on anticipated demand for the seed promoted by the 
intervention, and minimal equipment was provided and on a cost share basis. 
3 Poet, cultural critic, social activist, and farmer, 1934 – present.
31
CSP in Tanzania followed three models: ‘lead farmers’, ‘farmer groups’, and ‘primary school gardens’, 
each model reflecting desired outcomes of different donors. The church funded model was based on 
farmer groups at village level, one bilateral funded model focused on raising public sector capacities 
and targeted lead farmers for seed production, and a second bilateral funded model targeted school 
gardens. Government attempted to mandate the sourcing of Foundation seed at fixed prices. This 
was impossible to enforce (Foundation seed was priced at a multiple of five to certified seed and 
in some cases at a multiple of fifty to the local price of grain) and this led to a large variance in the 
prices for starter seed as reported by farmer groups, lead farmers, and schools. 
CSP in the Sudan case study was organized through ‘village agricultural committees’ that were the 
focus of seed provision and training from extension staff and seed inspectors from the Ministry of 
Agriculture on agronomy, production, storage, and seed quality. Village agricultural committees were 
expected to identify lead farmers for seed production, distribute seed to other farmers through a 
repayment system, and keep records. 
CSP in the Ethiopia case study was organized by ‘cooperative community based seed enterprise’, 
membership ranged from 40–300 across nine cooperatives, with a median of 68. The communal 
farms size ranged from 2.5 ha to more than 15 ha, with a median of 5 ha. These cooperatives were 
furnished with seed, irrigation equipment, seed cleaning equipment, seed stores, as well as training 
from local government extension agents. Successful cooperatives were characterized by strong 
collaboration with public sector actors (research, local agriculture and development offices, national 
trade organization). This reflects the presence of strong cooperatives in Ethiopia. 
CSP in Kenya was organized by ‘producer market groups’ that linked farmer groups with certified 
and commercial seed and with buyers of high value legumes. The groups were highly dispersed, 
operating across four districts and comprising more than 17,000 farmers, of which 65% were women. 
The community seed production efforts in Kenya promoted knowledge and access to new varieties 
through a value chain approach aimed at marketing seed and legumes by raising collaboration 
between producer groups, early generation seed producers, research partners, and buyers.
1.3. Support Role of Public, Private, Civil Society 
“…the solution requires the creative complementarities of public–private cooperation that…[and] 
must include … not-for-profit sector (foundations, NGOs, civil society). This pathway can develop 
and deliver solutions to large numbers of small farmers […]”
 Marco Ferroni4
The role of public, private, and civil society actors’ support varied across each of the five case studies. 
However, all three actors – public, private and civil society – played essential roles in all of the case 
studies and the roles and interdependency between these actors depended on the context. The 
public sector, with external funding and donor influence on program design, was a driver in Tanzania, 
Sudan, and Ethiopia. This reflects the crops targeted and the seed constraint addressed but more 
importantly reflects the socio-political environment and status of civil society organizations that are 
non-governmental and able to function outside of the political sphere.
The private sector, with linkages made by international research partners and with national research 
partners’ support, was a driver in the Ugandan and Kenyan case studies. This reflects the express 
aims of the protagonist to take a market-focused approach but also reflects a pre-existing market 
friendly or market-neutral environment where significant state engagement is not a pre-requisite.
Civil society actors – community based organizations, non-governmental organizations, village and 
church based groups – played an important role in organizing farmer aggregation and promoting 
linkages with public and private sector in all five case studies. This role changed considerably in 
each of the five case studies: in Sudan an international NGO was the project holder and a village 
agricultural committee, with significant state oversight, was the turn-key organization producing 
seed; in Ethiopia community cooperatives were the focal point of seed production but with 
4 Executive Director, Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture.
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significant state over sight; in Tanzania farmer groups backed by a church-based NGO operated with 
significant latitude in comparison to similar programs run through state organizations; in Uganda 
farmer groups comprised almost exclusively of women operated with a large degree of freedom 
and with limited state intervention; in Kenya two international NGOs were the project holders with 
hundreds of farmer producer groups. 
The role of national and international research organizations was prominent in all case studies but 
their specific contribution, Sudan and Ethiopia for example, was not always evident. In Kenya and 
Uganda, the international and national research role was in program design, identification of variety, 
and technical backstopping and training. For Tanzania, Sudan, and Ethiopia, national research was 
significant in identifying varieties for community seed producers where technical backstopping and 
training community seed producers was provided almost exclusively by state extension. This reflects 
the socio-political context of these countries.
1.4.  Key Areas of Support – Identification of Seed and Variety, Technical Support in 
Production & Marketing, Credit and Capital 
“Quality in a product or service is not what the supplier puts in. It is what the customer gets out 
and is willing to pay for.”
Peter Drucker5
The overall focus across the case studies reflected the objective of increasing the production of 
quality seed of improved varieties. This included support for inputs, training in seed production 
and seed quality control. The focus on supply was not matched with support for seed enterprise 
development and marketing. Marketing appeared more successful in vertically integrated schemes 
with few large buyers. While in many of the cases variety was the driver, in others it was seed.
In Uganda the key support provided was access to variety, training on seed production and post-
harvest handling. There was limited to no support provided on marketing seed but community seed 
producers were identified in Eastern Uganda where demand for bean seed, and the new varieties, 
was considered strong. There was minimal capital/financial support as equipment provided was on a 
cost share basis and was relatively cheap.
In Tanzania key support provided was access to variety and training on seed production. The varieties 
promoted that fared well with farmers were released at least four years before the community 
seed producers in the case study began multiplying them and so had at least some track record of 
being appreciated by farmers. Minimal technical support was provided on marketing despite an 
expectation for sales to recapture costs that was implicit in the project design of all three models 
of community seed production. Seed sales was a major challenge and undermined the incentives 
of community seed producers, particularly the lead farmers who had higher input costs and were 
initially prevented from selling outside of their community. Where seed producers groups reported 
successfully selling seed, it was due to a large brokered sale, between the church organization 
supporting farmer groups and FAO, or where there was a high market demand and strong promotion, 
for example schools in Singida. Capital/credit was not provided besides buy back schemes for 
Foundation seed and this proved problematic. 
In Sudan key support provided was access to seed. It is not clear from this case study if variety 
was critical but seed availability was a constraint in the project area. Training of seed producers in 
production and seed quality was referenced but not on marketing. A seed credit (pay back scheme) 
did not function well and was cited as a challenge. People affiliated with the community seed 
production reported not understanding how the buy-back scheme was supposed to work. Seed 
sales to organized buyers (NGO/government) was noted as a sign of success for one producer. The 
provision of capital and/or equipment and storage facilities for community seed producers was not 
noted in this case study.
5 Management consultant, author, and founder of modern management theory, 1909-2005.
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In Ethiopia key support provided was access to seed. It is not clear to what extent variety was critical 
but a significant number of varieties for different crops were made available through the community 
seed producers. Seed availability, due primarily to chronic drought and secondly to the relative 
isolation of the geo-zone of the community seed producers, was noted as a big constraint in the 
project area. Training to seed producers in production and seed quality was referenced but not on 
marketing. Capital for equipment and storage was provided to all community seed producers but the 
pay back terms and issues of sustainability were not discussed. 
In Kenya key support provided was access to variety, training on agronomy and seed production, and 
the facilitation of linkages between seed producers, seed consumers, public sector service providers, 
and output markets. No capital for equipment or storage was provided to any community seed 
producers. Challenges meeting contract terms was cited among producer groups.
In several of these case studies, key areas of support to community seed producers did not correlate 
clearly with what farmers would benefit, or potentially pay for, as a result of the services rendered 
by community seed producers. The primary customers of many of the services and support provided 
to community seed producers were not farmers, or even community seed producers, but parties 
gaining short-term benefits from a more vertically integrated seed supply chain. 
The classic example is of seed agencies (Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania) establishing certification 
schemes for community seed producers and then struggling to enforce by decree (Tanzania, Kenya, 
Ethiopia) as opposed to by farmer willingness to pay. One could conclude that farmers either did not 
value the certified seed or that the benefits of certified seed were not effectively communicated. 
In the Tanzania case study where there was strong documentation on pricing, the vast majority of 
community seed producers did not pay the Foundation seed price, all community seed producers 
struggled to sell to farmers, and there was no evidence that those community seed producers who 
did pay for and/or source foundation seed had no easier time selling their seed that community seed 
producers who did not pay for and/or source Foundation seed. 
1.5.  Subsidies - Source Seed, Production Inputs, Conditioning and Marketing - Linking 
Producer and Farmer
“When we give a subsidy, the benefits to the public ought to exceed the benefits to the [subsidy 
recipient]…. When it doesn’t, that’s our definition of corporate [and government] welfare.”
 John Kasich6
Significant subsidies for infrastructure, inputs, training and quality control existed in all case studies. 
However, there was widely varying value and transparency in these subsidies.
In Uganda the total value of subsidy provided to the community seed producer was very small, 
an explicit aim from the design. Start-up seed (sourced from the Ugandan bean program) and 
equipment (threshing rack, sorter, and plastic sheet for drying) were provided on a cost share basis 
to all of the community seed producers. Payback performance of the groups was not noted but ¾ of 
earnings were held by the group, presumably to pay off inputs costs. Subsidies to seed conditioning 
were only related to training. There was no equipment and capital support for storage. Marketing 
was covered in training but farmer groups noted the need for more support on promotion and 
making linkages to sell seed. 
For the Tanzania CSPs, the value of subsidies is difficult to assess but was limited to sourcing seed 
and training for producers. The Tanzanian seed agency attempted to set seed prices for Foundation 
seed at five times the suggested price for certified seed sold by community seed producers, with 
a result that Foundation seed sourcing and pricing was erratic. An assessment of seed sales across 
all three community seed production models in the same season indicated that a fraction of seed 
produced was sold whereas no sales of seed was reported by 1/3 of lead farmers, 1/4 of schools, 
6 American politician. 1952 – present.
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and 1/6 of farmer groups. Despite the fact that the national seed regulation in Tanzania forbade the 
sale of unpackaged and untreated seed outside the village of production, all three community seed 
producer models reported selling seed outside the village of production which was unpackaged and 
untreated. In most years, most of the seed produced in Tanzania under all three community seed 
production models was not sold, and was instead given away. Yet, none of these models reported 
having a plan or guidelines for allocating seed for free or at a deeply discounted price to vulnerable 
or cash strapped household and the intervention zones were noted for their high levels of poverty 
and farmer vulnerability to drought, which the varieties promoted were intended to address.
In Sudan, the value of subsidies is difficult to assess but seems to have been limited to training and 
source seed for CSPs that was provided under a seed pay back/seed loan repayment scheme. To the 
extent that repayment was a key strategy to achieve CSP targets of reaching 65,000 HH in Sudan, 
it fell short for all crops except for millet. Interestingly, millet reported seed loan repayment rate 
of 29% which may indicate that millet source seed was repeatedly provided to community seed 
producers in order for the CSPs in Sudan to have served the 92,000 HH they reported reaching with 
millet. Conversely, groundnut repayment rates were reported at 78% yet slightly less than 30,000 
HH were reached with groundnut by the CSPs, which likely indicates a low level of starter material in 
the first season of this three year effort and much slower multiplication rate of groundnut compared 
to millet. CSPs in the Sudan case study received training on conditioning and seed storage but 
there is no reference to any equipment or subsidies related to storage. There is no mention of seed 
marketing training for the Sudan CSPs although the study references that some CSPs sold seed back 
to the project, to individual farmers, and to formal seed companies.
For the Ethiopian CSPs, subsidies were very high and included source seed, irrigation equipment, 
seed cleaners, scales, packaging machines, and generators. The total value of subsidy to each CSP 
is not stated but based on equipment provided it is estimated to be at least USD 5000. CSPs were 
expected to provide land, labor, and construction materials for simple storage facilities. While seed 
was provided for free to CSPs, it was to be paid back into a revolving fund. Seed production at CSPs 
was done on a contractual basis but no details were provided on the terms of supply contracts, the 
buyers, or the profitability of CSPs. While training curriculum of CSPs was robust on production and 
certification there was no reference to marketing or cost accounting despite the relatively large 
subsidies involved and the stated focus on supply contracts. Based on several references in this case 
study to the importance of linkages with state actors as driving the success of CSPs, it is assumed that 
the CSP seed was marketed to state channels. 
In the Kenyan case study, the total value of subsidies is difficult to gauge but would appear limited 
given the orientation of a value chain approach and the aim to promote sustainable seed sales. Small 
starter packs of improved seed of quality legume varieties of pigeonpea, groundnut and chickpea 
varieties were sold to farmers in the CSP area but in order to bulk seed, the first identified producer 
groups in Kenya were initially provided source seed by the state parastatal on a contract basis with 
the expectation that they would sell product that met set standards to either legume buyers or back 
to the state parastatal if the seed was of high enough quality. Moreover, these producer groups were 
expected to be an emerging source of demand from the state parastatal as their initial seed declined 
in productivity. The scheme did not function as hoped. Many farmer groups did not hold up to their 
contracts and sold into spot grain markets while other farmer groups self-sourced over multiple 
seasons as opposed to buying again from the parastatal. Within the seed supply chain it was very 
difficult to track and uphold quality standards due to high transaction costs associated with large 
number of farmers, small size land holdings, many farmers new to working with quality standards, 
and competition with local food markets.
1.6. CSP Impact at Farmer and System Level
In all case studies, significant numbers of farmers were able to access quality seed from the CSPs. 
This increased overall varietal diversity and accelerated the adoption of new varieties.
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In Uganda the three CSPs produced less than four metric tons of two varieties of improved bean 
varieties and sold them at a modest premium to the crop price in grain markets. The CSPs were 
provided with limited training on production, pest and disease management, and post-harvest 
handling as well as linkages with research. Two of the three CSP groups continued selling bean seed 
four years after the project ended.
In Tanzania these three CSP models played a role in greatly increasing the spread of improved millet 
and sorghum varieties in central Tanzania. An ICRISAT adoption study in 2001 estimated that in the 
mid-1990s approximately 5% of total sorghum and millet was allocated to improved varieties. The 
2001 study indicated that more than 2/3 of farmers surveyed in Dodoma and more than 1/3 in 
Singida were planting improved sorghum variety Pato whereas pearl millet variety Okoa was grown 
by more than 1/4 of surveyed farmers in both Dodoma and Singida. So, in spite of the fact that only 
a fraction of the seed promoted by the models was sold by producers the evidence from the ICRISAT 
adoption study suggests that varieties were ultimately well diffused. Community seed producers in 
the Tanzania case study cited significant changes in seed production practices: field isolation, more 
careful site selection, harvesting when completely dry, drying on elevated structures, use of fertilizer. 
In 2001, TOSCA announced a new quality declared seed standard for pearl millet and sorghum with 
isolation distance of 100 m, where under the time of the CSP case study recommended isolation 
distances for certification was 300 m for pearl millet and 200 m for sorghum, which would suggest 
learning from the Tanzania case study in terms of the impracticability of large isolation distances for 
community-based seed producers.
In Sudan, the farm level impact was to help many communities have access to seed locally instead 
of sourcing at a great distance where they may have little recourse if there are issues related to 
germination or not being true to type. In addition, this would strengthen links within the supply 
chain from research to extension to seed inspection services to CSPs and ultimately farmers.
In Ethiopia the CSP model improved seed security in isolated chronically drought-affected 
communities through increasing the availability of seed. Actual numbers of farmers served are 
not indicated in the case study but based on the median CSP of 5 ha, we estimate 1,000 farmers 
were served annually per CSP. The biggest impact in Ethiopia is diversity as 414 varieties were 
demonstrated and/or multiplied among the CSPs.
In Kenya, more than 17,000 farmers were supplied with legume seed of improved varieties over 
a period of two years, which induced a ‘spill-over effect’. The project trained more than 50% of 
participating farmers who demonstrated good crop husbandry practices, value addition, group 
management and marketing. Farmers trained in seed production were contracted by a seed company 
to produce seed commercially. Most importantly, farmers were able to collectively market their 
produce at competitive prices.
1.7. Sustainability – CSP financial analysis, economic analysis of CSP impact
“But now sustainability is such a political category that it’s getting more and more difficult 
to think about it in a serious way. Sustainability has become an ornament.”
Rem Koolhaas7
Defining sustainability as socio-economic justification for the intervention and the extent to which 
actors supported by the intervention continue to function, the results are mixed across the case 
studies. There is a lack of financial information (project cost of interventions and financial returns to 
seed producers) and economic information (social cost and benefits of interventions) to assess the 
socio-economic value of any of these case studies. This does not suggest all were not successes but 
rather the extent, value, and impact of that success is not clear. 
7 Architect and design theorist, 1944 – present.
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In Uganda these CSPs were functioning a few years after the project ended and the relatively 
small size of the start-up support associated with these CSPs in Uganda suggests that this sort of 
intervention could be easily replicable where there is a window of opportunity for CSPs between 
incipient demand for available varieties with desirable traits and farmers achieving high enough rates 
of adoption in the CSP region to lower demand. 
In Tanzania it is not clear if any of the CSPs (school, farmer led, farmer group) continued to operate 
after project support from the main protagonists (ICRISAT, Ministry of Agriculture, Council of Churches) 
ceased. Fixed pricing for Foundation and Certified seed and a monopoly on Foundation seed provision 
was problematic in all CSP models in Tanzania and should not be pursued in other CSP efforts.
In the Sudan CSP case study, the seed pay back/seed loan repayment scheme appears to be the 
biggest impediment to this model functioning adequately over even a short time frame. Buy back 
schemes are a bad idea, their administration is costly and inefficient. While they do provide rent 
seeking opportunities for their administrators, there are more effective and efficient means to 
improve farmer access to seed and to increase seed availability.
Successful functioning of the Ethiopian CSP case study model seems contingent upon strong financial 
and technical support to the community cooperatives on the input and production side and much 
more explicit emphasis on seed sales and managing the balance sheets of the cooperatives. This 
model involves a relative high degree of subsidies and is by far the most public sector and project 
dependent of any of the CSPs. For these community cooperative models to break even financially 
and to make sound seed production investments, a significant percentage of seed produced 
(approximating total annual production costs for the cooperative) will need to be committed for 
purchase a year in advance by state agencies or development projects. 
The Kenyan CSP case study achieved impact and scale in terms of increasing the availability of and 
improving farmer access to improved legume seed. However, a key stated objective was to create a 
demand driven seed supply chain from breeder seed to seed maintenance at producer group level 
to commercial seed supply for both provision of new varieties and for re-supplying producer groups 
when productivity lagged of existing varieties. The model had challenges on the demand and supply 
side. There was not effective demand to drive commercial seed supply as many producer groups self-
sourced from the first year as they had enough seed. There was not effective supply to out-growers 
as many producer groups that were contracted as seed out-growers did not sell back to the project 
but sold into food markets. 
2. Recommendations and Conclusions
2.1. Standard Frameworks to Conduct Ex-Ante Description and Diagnosis 
There needs to be an explicit baseline assessment of the target seed system to inform the decision 
to first invest in CSPs and then to establish clear objectives. This framework should embrace 
the concept of ‘integrated seed system development’ and balance inclusiveness with long-term 
sustainability. The ex-ante assessment will determine why, where and which crops warrant an 
investment. Baseline analysis will lead to a seed system diagnosis and a decision-making guide that 
should be based on simple rules, to induce action without unnecessarily limiting options, and a 
checklist aimed at setting performance boundaries while leaving ample scope for flexibility. Seed 
system practitioners are reminded that most operating environments that justify a CSP investment 
are not stable and that as an environment’s dynamism increases, flexibility grows in importance and 
simple rules become imperative. 
2.2. Economic Value Attributable to Seed
Estimating the economic gains attributable to a new variety and to seed and varieties that have 
disease incidence and are physiologically healthy will help to prioritize the potential seed system 
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investments (crops, varieties, seed quality, agronomy) and help to identify and justify the magnitude 
of the investment opportunity for the private sector, public sector, and/or development entities. 
There is confusion over the respective potential of new varieties, existing varieties, and of quality 
seed on yields. The starting point is a simple cost-benefit model aimed at farmers to evaluate the 
productivity gains from different seed interventions in order to prioritize interventions and to 
explicitly estimate the total value of the productivity gap. This will also inform price, i.e., – what a 
farmer might be willing to pay. In unstable environments, the productivity targets should be aimed at 
modest increases to pre-shock yields. 
2.3. Identify what pieces can be commercial and what pieces need subsidy
Once the scope of the opportunity is valued and priority areas of investment are identified, the 
potential role of private, public, and civil society or NGO entities needs to be considered. Where 
farmers are easily convinced that the varieties are superior to their current varieties or that 
purchased seed is of higher quality and results in higher yields than own saved seed, a focus on 
supporting private sector seed actors is fully warranted. For crops and varieties where there is a 
potential for commercial opportunities, CSPs should be closely linked to the private sector as out-
growers. Where there is no or low potential for commercial opportunity, CSPs should be closely 
linked to the public sector. Where there are commercial opportunities, development actors should 
focus on promoting an enabling environment for nascent private sector entities but be cognizant 
of the tendency for elite capture.8 Developmental support aimed at promoting an enabling private 
sector may include: direct support to the private entity to improve their business and/or seed 
production and quality capacity; and/or direct support to the public sector so that they can provide 
public goods (seed, quality control) to the private entity; and/or direct support to the consumer to 
raise demand through advertising, increasing access to demos, and couponing.
2.4. What Parts of CSP Most Needs Incentive Schemes for non-commercial purposes?
How can subsidies be used effectively when the objective is developmental and not commercial? 
Subsidies for developmental CSPs need to be targeted, explicit and of short duration. Continued 
support from the public sector is essential for the efficiency and viability of CSPs, more so with 
developmental CSPs which by nature provide public sector goods. Subsidies for developmental CSPs 
should be focused on training related to seed production, seed quality, and CSP management, and 
access to Foundation seed and of new varieties. Development entities are short-term catalysts to 
support the creation, management, and capacity of CSPs – to include training and especially linkage – 
but have no long-term role. Support to the public seed sector for development needs to be sustained.
2.5. Where does the CSP hinder growth and hurt consumers?
CSPs hinder growth and hurt consumers when they compete with or create an impediment to the 
establishment of a private seed company which is likely to deliver seed and related products more 
efficiently and more sustainably than the CSP. Unfortunately, much of the dialogue around private 
sector actors in seed systems is focused not on efficiency or the benefit accrued to consumers, but 
whether a private sector actor could potentially function in a given environment. Contrary to the 
current orthodoxy, private sector entities should not be cherry picked for investment where the 
public sector can deliver seed more efficiently and effectively and at lower risk to the consumer. The 
tendency for CSPs is to be subsidized too long, after the point at which varieties and productivity 
enhancing technologies have reached a tipping point in the target zone and their further adoption 
is no longer dependent on raising the availability of these technologies. CSP investments should be 
predicated on a clearly defined strategy that estimates the time frame for exiting the target zone. 
8 Examples would be where a spouse, uncle, or friend of a project officer or project administrator starts a seed business due to 
preferential information and preferential access to subsidized capital (low or no interest loan), subsidized asset (equipment or land 
partially or fully paid for by project), and/or guaranteed output market for seed produced (percentage of production sold back to the 
project). 
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2.6. Conclusions 
• Community seed production is necessary to improve formal and farmer seed system links.
• Subsidies for the establishment of commercially linked CSPs need to be targeted, explicit and of 
short duration.
• Community seed production objectives should be explicit and include coherent activities for 
closing out, transitioning into commercial entities, or linking with publicly funded programs. 
• Community seed production is more effective when there is strong collaboration between the 
public sector, the commercial sector, and civil society /NGOs.
• The lack of standard ex-ante seed system diagnostics, including economic analysis to justify the 
scale and scope of interventions, significantly limits the capacity of donors and seed practitioners 
to make rational investments and intervention design decisions. 
